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Alfred Verdross and the Contemporary Constitutionalisation Debate 
Aoife O’Donoghue 
Abstract 
Within international law Verdross is an influential figure. Verdross' examinations of 
international community, jus cogens and multilateralism are particularly significant and it is 
from his exploration of these elements of international law that his insights on international 
constitutionalisation emerged. His impact can be felt in the contemporary 
constitutionalisation debate. His influence on the debate is evident, to varying degrees, in the 
work of several international legal scholars such as Mosler, Tomuschat, Simma, De Wet, 
Peters and Fassbender. Verdrossian international constitutional theory has become dominant 
within the various constitutionalisation theories that have emerged, particularly those that 
centre upon jus cogens, international community and multilateralism although arguably it is 
the theories that rely on core norms within the international legal order which owe the most to 
Verdross and his nascent development of international constitutionalisation. 
Key Words 
Verdross, constitutionalisation, jus cogens, international community, constitutionalism 
1. Introduction 
To convince an audience of its validity a theory must possess an extensive historical narrative 
underpinning its development. Arguably, the international constitutionalisation debate still 
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lacks such a narrative.
1
 Broadly, constitutionalisation is ‘a process, extending constitutional 
structures to fora and layers of governance other than nations’ however, differences of 
opinion among its advocates as to its precise implications makes delineating its character 
complex.
2
 Understanding its historical development should make critique and analysis more 
coherent. This is not to propose that a single historical theory of constitutionalisation which 
all of its promoters can agree upon exists or that contemporary attempts to describe its 
relevance have not been worthwhile but rather that considering the grounds of the debate and 
its historical roots should enable fuller deliberation.
3
 
Verdross is an important figure in the development of international law in the 20
th
 Century 
with a career spanning the First World War until his death in 1980. He was central to the 
expansion of jus cogens and monism, the development of the UN Charter as a centrifugal 
force in international law as well as the first glimmers of the constitutionalisation debate. 
This article attempts to examine the connection between the contemporary 
constitutionalisation debate and Verdross and considers his work in the context of his own 
emergent constitutionalisation theory. Further, the article attempts to identify those within the 
constitutionalisation debate whose ancestry are linked to Verdross.
4
 
Loughlin argues that  
                                                          
1
 The first mentions of constitutionalisation in the international context seem to appear in Holtzendorff, in 1877, 
however as Opsahl correctly points out it was much later that a more systematic approach would become 
evident, T. Opsahl ‘An “International Constitutional Law”?’ (1961) 10 ICLQ 760,761 
2
 T Cottier & M. Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Constitutionalism’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 261, 264, for contrasting theories see, P Dobner & M Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (OUP, 2010), J Klabbers, A Peters & G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalisation of International 
Law (OUP, 2009), D Z Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (OUP 2005), B 
Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of The International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 529, E Petersmann ‘How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and International Organizations’ (1997) 10 LJIL 421 
3
 See for example, K. Milewicz, ‘Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Towards a Conceptual 
Framework’ (2009) 16 Indiana J. Global Legal Studies 41, Fassbender (n 2) 529, Opsahl (n 1), T. Giegerich, 
‘The Is and Ought of International Constitutionalism: How Far Have We Come on Habermas’s Road to a “Well-
Considered Constitutionalization of International Law”’ (2009) 10 (1) German Law Journal 31 
4
Fassbender (n 2) 529, Fassbender has also discussed the role of Verdross in the constitutionalisation debate at 
541 - 544 
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‘the modern idea of the constitution results from a basic shift that took place in 
conceiving the relationship between government and people: rejecting traditional 
orderings based upon status and hierarchy, it expressed the conviction that 
government, being an office established by the people, must be based on their 
consent.’5  
International constitutionalisation is a process by which international law moves beyond its 
sovereign foundations as well as its vertical and western bias, to a system of law founded on a 
process which is hierarchal, normative and structured.  
Constitutionalism is a system of law comprising core norms indelibly linked to a particular 
structural order. Klabbers argues that constitutionalism is more than legalisation,
6
 as such; 
international constitutionalisation must represent more than a process of legalisation, 
jurification or other phenomena connected to the normal development of international law.
7
 
As international law moves beyond a simplex order of equal subjects international 
constitutionalisation offers a framework to understand these developments and identifies the 
adoption of norms and structures that could rightly be described as constitutional. 
Constitutional and public law structures are not exclusive to the domestic sphere.
8
 Indeed 
Walter argues that state and constitutionalism are separable and while the transfer to the non-
state sphere requires some contextual changes to adapt to another governance order these are 
not in-surmountable.
9
  
                                                          
5
 M Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in Dobner & Loughlin (n 2) 47- 48. 
6
 Klabbers, Peters & Ulfstein (n 2) 1-3 
7
 In contrast to Klabbers, Peters argues that ‘[g]lobal constitutionalism is an academic and political agenda that 
identifies and advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the international legal sphere in 
order to improve the effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal order. A Peters, ‘The Merits of 
Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 16 Indiana J. Global Legal Studies 397 
8
 A Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism Revisited’ (2005) 11 International Legal Theory 39 
9
 C. Walter, ‘International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization’ in J E Nijman & A Nollkaemper. New 
Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law (OUP, 2007) De Wet also argues that there 
is no reason for not using constitutional law in the international context, explaining that for instance Germany 
and the United States make use of it in their federal systems and also the EU's use of constitutional language. 
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International constitutionalisation does not offer a utopian vision of international law. 
Recognised within these theories are incoherencies which suggest that the international legal 
order is, as yet, only a partially constituted system.
10
 Even if international 
constitutionalisation never emerges, an examination of international law from a constitutional 
perspective offers a useful investigative tool for better understanding international law’s 
character. This article seeks to contribute to the constitutionalisation debate and international 
constitutionalism by suggesting that the writings of Alfred Verdross are core to understanding 
its development. 
This account begins with an outline of Verdross’ work on international community, jus 
cogens and multilateralism. A discussion of the contemporary constitutionalisation debate 
follows with particular focus on the propositions of Mosler, Tomuschat, Simma, De Wet, 
Peters and Fassbender as examples of Verdross' influence on the constitutionalisation debate. 
This piece considers what a Verdrossian understanding of constitutionalisation has to offer 
the participants in the current constitutionalisation debate and in doing so, attempts to gauge 
Verdross’ impact. The variations within the constitutionalisation debate makes tracing 
Verdross’ impact not as straightforward as drawing a direct lineage through the discussions. 
Collins argues that, ‘[i]f international legal obligation no longer rests on consent, then a 
logical line of ‘constitutional theory’ might develop Verdross’ conviction of a foundational 
core of ethics or morality which binds society together.’11 This article seeks to understand 
whether such a core is evident in Verdross' work and what this implies about those modern 
constitutionalists who follow a Verdrossian form of constitutionalism.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Erika De Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 51, 52, Neil Walker, ‘Taking 
Constitutionalism beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519, 522 For another discussion of the core 
arguments against using constitutionalism domestically see Cottier & Hertig (n 2) 282 – 296. 
10
 For instance Paulus and Habermas both agree that the current system has not evolved into a fully constituted 
order. J Habermas, (C. Cronin trans) The Divided West (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006) 115 -116, A L Paulus, 
‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in J L Dunoff & J P Trachtman, (eds) ‘Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance’ (CUP, 2009) 72 
11
 R Collins, ‘Constitutionalism as Liberal – Juridical Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past’ 
(2009) 22 LJIL 251, 272 
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This article does not discuss the validity of the constitutionalisation debate. While important, 
the aim here is to understand one aspect of the constitutionalisation debate’s evolution and 
not to provide a justification for alternatively undermining or underpinning the theory. 
Instead, this article hopes to provide a basis for a more nuanced debate on 
constitutionalisation by providing a better understanding of its roots.  
2. Verdross and International Law  
Over the course of his long career Verdross engaged with a considerable number of topics, 
far more than can be considered here.
12
 His career began prior to the First World War but it 
was in the age of multilateralism, after the creation of the League of Nations, that it gained 
significance. His impact on the debates surrounding the Weimar Constitution, the 
international community and as early as 1937, the nascent concept of jus cogens, are amongst 
his most prescient contributions.
13
 Analysing Verdross' work in the post-Charter era is 
essential as it is here that he placed the Charter at the heart of both international law and 
community.
14
 It is in community, jus cogens and multilateralism, that Verdross establishes 
his approach to international constitutionalisation.
15
  
It is important to acknowledge that, as with all long careers, Verdross’ approach evolved. 
Two examples are his approaches to jus cogens and the Charter. In 1937, Verdross claimed 
                                                          
12
 See for example A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926), Völkerrecht (Springer, 
1937), Antike Rechts - und Staatsphilosophie (Springer, 1948), Die Quellen des Universellen Volkerrechts: eine 
Einfuhrung (1973), Neutralité permanente de l'Autriche (Verlag für. Politik u. Geschichte, 1978), (with B. 
Simma) Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis (3rd ed., Duncker u. Humblot, 1984). Unfortunately for 
the non-German speaker, much of Verdross’ work is still only available in German however this should not 
prevent a wider audience from engaging and understanding his work. 
13
 Verdross ’Die Verfassung’ (n 12), A. Verdross, ‘Reichsrecht und Internationales Recht. Eine Lanze für Art 3 
des Regierungsentwurfs der Deutschen Verfassung’, (1919) 24 Deutsche Juristenzeitung 291, A. Verdross, 
‘Forbidden Treaties in International Law, Comments on Professor Garner’s Report on “The Law of Treaties”’ 
31 (1937) AJIL 571, 571  
14
 A. Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’ (1966) 60 AJIL 55, Proposals and 
comments submitted by Mr. Alfred Verdross regarding the draft provisional articles on consular intercourse and 
immunities (A/CN.4/L.79) 
15
 The publication in 1926 of Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft is the first clear evidence of 
Verdross interest in a constitutional approach. 
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there were two jus cogens categories. Eventually this became three classes.
16
 Initially, his 
arguments on constitutionalisation were not linked to any specific institution but eventually 
were tied to the Charter. Thus, in presenting Verdross’ constitutionalisation theory care is 
necessary to not overstate the development of a firm Verdrossian perspective.  
This section will examine Verdross as a natural lawyer, his view of international community 
and finally discuss Verdross' approach to jus cogens and the role of multilateralism. This will 
touch upon the key aspects of what has arguably developed into Verdrossian 
constitutionalisation. 
A. The Natural Law and International Community 
While Verdross was ensconced within the Kelsenian School, having first been a student and 
then a colleague of Kelsen, it is from within the natural law that his international legal theory 
developed.
17
 A natural law ethic is evident in two aspects of his work; community and jus 
cogens and both are pivotal in the development of a Verdross' theory on constitutionalisation. 
This section addresses Verdross’ understanding of community and the natural law. The Stoic-
Christian tradition of international community, Aquinas’ writing on the false nature of the 
subordination of the individual to the state and allegiance extending beyond the nation are 
significant in understanding Verdross' view of the role of international community.
18
 This is 
                                                          
16
 Verdross ‘Forbidden’ (n 13), A Von Verdross, ‘On the Concept of International Law’ (1949) 43 AJIL 435, 
Verdross, ‘Dispositivum’ (n 14) 
17
 For examples of his views see A Verdross, ‘Two Arguments for an Empirical Foundation of Natural-Law 
norms: An examination of Johannes Messner’s and Victor Kraft’s approaches’ (1975) 3 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 151, Verdross, ‘Concept’ (n 16) and A. Verdross, ‘Fundamental Human 
Rights, The Journey of an Idea’ (1979-1980) 8 Human Rights 20 (Trans. J D Gorby, Originally published 
Anzeiger der Philosophen-historischen Klasse der österr Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1954 355) J. Kunz, ‘The 
‘Vienna School’ and International Law’ (1933-1934) 11 New York University Quarterly Law Review 370, J. 
Kammerhofer, ‘Kelsen – Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to International Law’ (2009) 22 
LJIL 225, 246 - 247, A. Truyol y Serra ‘Verdross et la théorie du droit’ (1994) 5 EJIL 55, 56 
18
 A. Verdross & H. Franz Koeck, ‘Natural Law: The Tradition of Natural Law and Reason’ in R. St. J. 
Macdonald, D M Johnston, (eds.) The Structure and Process of International Law (Brill, 1983) 18 – 19, 22, 
Verdross, ’Fundamental (n 17) 23, T Aquinas, A Treatise on Law (trans. R J Egan) (2000), T. Aquinas, Selected 
Political Writings (trans. J. G. Dawson) (1959) Seneca’s Fifth Letter to Lucilius quoted in A Rorty, The Many 
Faces of Philosophy (2003), The Republic, The Laws (trans N. Rudd) (1998) 
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evident in Verdross’ opposition to totalitarian regimes but also his view of the international 
community as connected, but not subordinate, to the state.
 19
 
The views espoused by the Spanish School of international law are critical.
20
 Suárez’s notion 
that international law emerges in a ‘universal community-orientated philosophy’ where the 
community requires a legal order to govern their relations with each other influenced 
Verdross.
21
 Verdross uses Suárez’s community, one that may be adapted or changed, but 
which is based within law as an essential aspect of the functioning of a legal order, and adapts 
it for 20
th
 century international law. 
As a natural lawyer, Verdross confronted the positivist approach to international law that 
questioned both its existence and operation. While Verdross sought to suggest, if possible, 
solutions to any divergences that arose in practice between the two theories, he still 
maintained that the natural law is the correct approach.
22
 The claim that the law of nations 
has not developed sufficiently to be truly “law” is a key distinction between positivism and 
natural law.
23
 For positivists international law is dependent on sovereign will.  
A good contrast between a positivist and natural law approach to the international order is 
Hegel and Verdross. Three key tenants underpin Hegel’s approach to international law. First, 
he argues that the nation state is the highest order of power.
24
 The state is the highest moral 
power and law is always of the state; as such international law is but a norm which cannot be 
                                                          
19
 Verdross, ’Fundamental (n 17) 232, B Simma, ‘The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of 
International Law’ (1995) 6 EJIL 33 at 38 It is also important to keep in mind the evolving political situation, 
particularly in the inter-war period when Verdross was writing and the impact this may have had on his work. 
20
 Verdross & Koeck (n 18) 19 -21, Simma (n 19) 38. 
21
 G L Williams, A Brown, J Waldron, ‘Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, S.J, De Legibus, ac 
deo Legislatore, 1612, Defensio Fidie Catholicae, et Apostolicae Adversus Anglicanae Sectae Errores, 1613, De 
Triplici Virtute Theologica Fide, Spe, et Charitate, 1621’. Volume II, The Translation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1944) 341, Simma (n 19) 39, R. S. Hartigan, ‘Francesco de Vitoria and Civilian Immunity’ (1973) 1 Political 
Theory 79 
22
 Verdross & Koeck (n 18) 19 - 21, Verdross & Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (n 12) 16. 
23
 For example Hobbes asserted that a lack of superior authority robs international law of its status as law T. 
Hobbes, ‘Leviathan’ (1991) 244 
24
 Anonymous, ‘Hegel’s Political Philosophy of the State’ (1917-1918) 31 HLR 78  
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achieved as its existence is on the whim of the state. Second, Hegel affirms that it is within 
the state that the individual’s rights are realised and thus, it is the only community of 
consequence. Universal justice is based within the state and international law is a derivative 
of state interactions based on the sovereignty and autonomy of states, as such, the state and 
the exercise of individual freedom are intertwined.
25
 Third, Hegel believes that the state, as 
the realisation of a moral idea, is legitimate simply due to its existence.
26
 For Hegel, the state 
has no imposed limitations; state sovereignty does not allow any other interpretation. To 
recognise a Verdrossian civil society of states overarching the sovereign state an international 
community is required and, to Hegel, this would be an anachronism.  
Verdross argued that an international community does not rely on such a positivist 
paradigm.
27
 Verdross’ monist interpretation of municipal and international law is essential to 
understanding how he came to this position.
28
 He regards international and domestic law as 
one system and thus the truncation of the development of community at state level does not 
arise and an international community can develop. Verdross argues that the domestic 
constitution is intertwined with the international legal order and as such both are part of the 
same international legal order and therefore one community.  
A key example of the differences between the Hegelian and Verdrossian approaches are the 
debates surrounding the Weimar Republic’s Constitution and its accommodation of 
international law.
29
 A positivist proposal placed the state at its core, thus enabling Germany 
to choose when and in what manner to be bound by international law. In Hegelian 
international law, as the state and its community are always supreme and the optimal model 
                                                          
25
 L. Miraglia, ‘Comparative Legal Philosophy Applied to Legal Institutions’ Modern Legal Philosophy Series, 
Vol. III, (1912). (J. Lisle, trans., reprinted 1968) 69 
26
 Anonymous (n 24) 81. 
27
 Simma (n 19) 42. 
28
 H. Janzen, ‘The Monism of Alfred Verdross’ (1935) 29 American Political Science Review 387 
29
 Verdross, 'Reichsrecht’ (n 12), Simma (n 19) 41, Simma writes that Verdross was influenced by Blackstone in 
his interpretation of the incorporation of international law into domestic law.  
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of governance, it at this level where constitutive decision-making should occur. Such a view 
requires a dualist model of international law where the state constitution is always the 
arbitrator of legitimacy.
30
  
In contrast, Verdross argued that the validity of international law is not a question for 
domestic constitutions. The only matter left to the domestic order is how international law is 
integrated into state law and not its validity.
31
 Verdross addressed the differences between 
universalism and state individualism and argues that universalism derives from the notion of 
the moral unity of mankind as a norm, whereas individualism centres on factual occurrences 
and, as such, is too caught up in their significance.
32
 A Hegelian positivist approach rejects 
this; since the state and the individual are indelibly intertwined the state is the only legitimate 
community, as such, an international or universalist community, lacking such a nexus, results 
in negative consequences for the individual. In contrast, for Verdross, international law is 
developed by the community of states; either through custom, treaty or via other sources of 
law. Critically, adherence cannot be made or unmade by any individual state.
33
 Following 
Verdross’ questioning of its commitment to international law the positivist draft was 
rejected.
34
 
The Verdrossian community centres on a universalist ethic rooted in the natural law. 
Verdross argues that ‘we must ask what are the moral tasks states have to accomplish in the 
international community.’35 The sphere of action is limited to the universal ethics of the 
international community that establishes an ‘ethical minimum.’36 This is not unproblematic as 
                                                          
30
 G H Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Original Published 1821, Cosmo Press, 2008), 196-198, W E Conklin 
Hegel's Laws: The Legitimacy of a Modern Legal Order (Stanford University Press, 2010) 298 
31
 Simma (n 19) 40. 
32
 Ibid 40. 
33
 Verdross did not accept the idea of instant custom. H Mosler, ‘Book Review: Die Quellen des universellen 
Völkerrechts: eine Einführung;’ (1974) 68 AJIL 350 at 351 
34
 Verdross, ‘Reichsrecht’ (n 12). 
35
 Verdross, ‘Forbidden’ ( n 13) 574.  
36
 Ibid 574. 
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identifying the attributes of this ethical minimum is almost as difficult as ascertaining the 
members of the international community.
37
 
A key characteristic of Verdross’ constitutionalisation is its reliance upon international 
community. Verdross divided the international community between the pre- and post-Charter 
era. In the former the community existed but was disorganised, in the latter period, the 
community became organised.
38
 As well as being an example of the evolution of Verdross’ 
own approach to international law, this foreshadows the importance of the Charter to 
Verdross’ constitutionalisation and marries the international community to the UN.  
B. The Natural Law and Jus Cogens 
Verdross was instrumental in the development of jus cogens as an important aspect of 
international law.
39
 Verdross developed jus cogens, from a narrow concept in 1937 to a broad 
cohort of norms underpinning all aspects of international law in the late 1960s. Jus cogens 
norms are also important to his constitutionalism and the threads of his constitutional 
narrative may be observed in his analysis of them. This section considers the development of 
jus cogens over the course of Verdross’ career.  
The influence of both the natural law and Suárez are important in how Verdross characterises 
jus cogens. Contemporaries of Suárez considered international law to have developed through 
necessity and consent,
40
 whereas Suárez argued that the main difference between natural law 
and jus gentium is that the natural law can serve only good, whereas jus gentium may permit 
                                                          
37
 See for examples the work of D Otto, ‘Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global 
Community and the Incommensurability of Difference’ (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 337, R Buchanan & S 
Pahyja, ‘Law, Nation and (Imagined) International Communities’ (2004) 8 Law, Text, Culture 137, C Douzinas, 
Human Rights and Empire, The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism (Routledge Cavendish, 2007) 142, 
Dino Kristsiotis, ‘Imagining the International Community’ (2002) 13 EJIL 961 
38
 Verdross, ‘Fundamental’ (n 17) 23. 
39
 Verdross, ‘Forbidden’ (n 13) Verdross, ‘Concept’ (n 16), Verdross, ‘Dispositivum’ (n 14). 
40
 D Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’ (1986) 27 HJIL 1 at 4 
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‘some evils’ as it may, by consent, adapt over time.41 The idea of change by consent and 
necessity is an anathema to the proponents of jus cogens norms.
42
 Indeed, according to 
Verdross, the decisive element that elevates jus cogens is that ‘they do not exist to satisfy the 
needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the whole community.’43 As with 
international community, jus cogens are divided between the pre- and post-Charter era.
44
  
Verdross argues that neither treaty nor customary law is based upon the internal wrangling of 
states, and as such authority in international law is not based upon domestic constitutions. He 
contended that the legitimacy of international law was not reliant upon the recognition of its 
validity by state constitutions.
45
 Higher norms, such as jus cogens, supersede domestic 
constitutions. This does not dismiss states as vital to the development of international law, but 
recognises their role as subordinate, particularly in the recognition of jus cogens. Arguably, 
this places jus cogens at the apex of Verdross’ international legal, and potentially 
constitutional, order. 
Jenzen argues that Verdross’ theory, from a pragmatic perspective, appears more expedient 
because it is not predicated on the dogma of sovereignty.
46
 The norms established in jus 
cogens exist independent of state consent. Kunz argues this form of analysis incorporates two 
conceptions of sovereignty, ‘[s]overeignty as a presupposed conception and sovereignty as a 
                                                          
41
 ‘Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez’ (n 21) 352-353, 343-349, 354 
42
 For an overview of jus cogens in current international law see A Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms in 
International Law (OUP, 2006) 
43
Verdross, ‘Dispositivum’ (n 14) 220. 
44
 The three articles in the development come from 1937, 1949 and 1966 respectively. Verdross, ‘Forbidden’ ( n 
13), Verdross, ‘Concept’ (n 16) 435, Verdross, ‘Dispositivum’ (n 14) 55  
45
 Verdross, 'Reichsrecht' (n 13). The unstable nature of domestic law and succession of states to international 
obligations is further evidence of this. This is true of treaty law and to an extent customary law. The rules 
regarding subsequent and persistent objectors could be a counter to this as seen in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
case, (1951) ICJ Rep 116 
46
 Janzen (n 28) 402. 
12 
 
conception deriving from the contents of inter-national law.’47 Placing sovereignty within the 
realms of international law implies that it is not absolute but rather a creature of  
law.
48
  
Verdross argues that only those who wish to rely on the will of states, and as such only on 
treaty law, can exclude the existence of jus cogens. He suggests that,  
'[t]he existence of such norms in general international law is particularly contested by 
those authors who base the whole international law on the agreement of the wills of 
the states...the possibility of norms of general international law, norms determining 
the limits of the freedom of the parties to conclude treaties, cannot be denied a 
priori.'
49
  
Thus, jus cogens norms are not reliant upon states, or domestic constitutions for their 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, he also argues even if a state-centric claim is accepted, the law of 
treaties presupposes the existence of rules of international law and thus the use of treaties 
alone is insufficient to disregard jus cogens.
50
  
Higher norms form a vital aspect of Verdross’ international constitutionalism. Verdross 
asserts that positive law develops through a hierarchical system of norms instituted by organs 
in the international legal order. This is core to Verdross’ monism and is also linked to his 
discourse on positivism versus the natural law. The international legal order’s “unwritten 
constitution” is discoverable through an examination of the legal acts at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and tracing where these acts receive their authority. Verdross argues that the 
                                                          
47
 Kunz (n 17) 398. 
48
 Ibid 400. 
49
 Verdross, ‘Forbidden’ (n 13) 572. 
50
 Verdross, ‘Forbidden’ (n 13) 571-572. 
13 
 
international community creates a positive legal system and this system is based on a 
common ethical understanding of core standards of international law reflected in jus cogens: 
‘As these norms are always created by an organized community of states, this writer 
calls them the “internal law of the community of States” (internes Staaten 
Gemeinschaftsrecht). Under this name this writer means such rules of private, 
criminal, administrative and disciplinary law as may be issued by a community of 
states for the regulation of the conduct of individuals immediately subject to this 
community of states. This group of norms must not be confused with the norms 
governing the conduct of the states united in this community. As the latter have as 
their object the organization of the particular community of states and form, therefore, 
its constitutional law, it is of a community of states.’51 
Initially, Verdross divided jus cogens into two groups.
52
 The first group consisted of single 
compulsory norms, one-off examples of laws from which there are no derogation.
53
 The 
second group were norms which established laws contra bonos mores. This group emerged 
from the commonality of all juridical orders that ‘regulate the rational and moral coexistence 
of the members of a community.’54 The exact nuance of this original division is somewhat 
unclear. Verdross maintains that there is no juridical order, including an international 
juridical order that could accept a norm which would be contrary to the principles of the 
community.
55
 While he did acknowledge that the ethics of the international community were 
not as developed as the ethics of national communities, and as such the range of sources 
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available to judicial systems was not necessarily comparable, he argues these differences are 
overestimated since in international law there are ethical minimums.
56
  
Acknowledging the altered situation brought about by the Charter, Verdross reconceptualised 
jus cogens into three distinct groups.
57
 The first group protect third states from treaties 
encroaching upon their sovereignty. This first group is similar though not identical to the 
original 1937 group. Yet, this first group is not as specific as it encompasses treaties which 
could impose upon the rights of third states such as rights over the high seas, as per the 
original first group. Nonetheless, this first jus cogens group is somewhat narrower as a 
consequence some of the original first category is subsumed into two new groups.
58
  
In the second category (in 1937 this held aspects of group two), Verdross places norms that 
substantiate humanitarian ideals that protect the individual over the state.
59
 These norms, 
based upon humanitarian grounds, come within the conception of contra bonos mores but are 
more specific than the original group. The third group of norms evidences the chief 
transformation of jus cogens by the Charter and its articles on the use of force.
60
 It centres the 
Charter at the core of international law and the newly organised community.
61
  
Verdross considered these three groups as incontrovertible parts of international law. 
‘a norm having the character of jus cogens can practically be created only by a norm 
of general customary law or by a general or multilateral convention. Indeed, the 
customary law of the former unorganized international society had already accepted 
certain limits on the liberty of states to conclude treaties by its recognition of the 
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“general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” as a subsidiary source of 
international law. Article 38, paragraph 3, of the Statue of the Permanent Court only 
codifies an old practice of international arbitration in this field’62 
Verdross maintains the older form of jus cogens to the extent that they existed in a 
‘disorganised community.’63 Thus, the establishment of the UN resulted in an organised 
community centred upon the Charter. This focuses the idea of community and jus cogens into 
the operation and function of the UN, though Verdross’ reference to the Statute of the 
Permanent Court broadens this approach slightly.  
This approach excludes other, particularly economic, organisations, from a place at the heart 
of the international legal order. The first category of jus cogens could encompass, for 
example, trade law. The treaties which operate under the WTO incorporate the most favoured 
nation doctrine which, by its very nature, impacts upon third states that are not bound by the 
organisation.
64
 Therefore, it would seem pertinent to have a broader scope than the UN to this 
first category to accommodate a wider application of international law. 
Mosler argues that the hierarchy of norms established by Verdross reflects his natural law 
inclinations and suggests that his work on jus cogens and the sources of international law are 
indicative of the ‘constitutional principles’ established in Verdross’ earlier work.65 Verdross’ 
central tenant is that the will of the state is not paramount. This is clear in his arguments 
regarding the Weimar Constitution and in his development of jus cogens norms.
66
 
                                                          
62
 Verdross, ‘Dispositivum’ (n 14) 61. 
63
 Ibid 62. 
64
 This includes aspects of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 1 and General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article II. Members of the WTO who have regional trade agreements 
with non-members of the WTO also extend some of the legal parameters of the WTO beyond the membership 
of the organisation.  
65
 Mosler, ‘Book Review’ (n 33) 350. 
66Verdross, ‘Reichsrecht’ (n 12), ‘Verdross, ‘Forbidden’ (n 13). 
16 
 
Fundamentally, the natural law foundations of international law exclude as improbable a 
state-centred approach.  
Jus cogens are at the heart of the international legal order and are central to the development 
and workings of the hierarchy of norms.
67
 The placement of jus cogens at the core of 
international law is linked to the Charter however jus cogens remains the focal point of 
Verdrossian constitutionalisation. Orakhelashvili references and relies on Verdross in his 
seminal work on jus cogens.
68
 He states that, ‘[p]eremptory norms prevail not because the 
States involved have so decided but because they are intrinsically superior and cannot be 
dispensed with through standard inter-State transactions.’69 This description is clearly linked 
to Verdross’ depiction of jus cogens. 
While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not define jus cogens its 
limitations on state action appears to fall in-line with Verdross’ approach, though this is 
unsurprising given, at the time of its final drafting, his place on the International Law 
Commission.
70
 In line with Verdross, the International Law Commission’s 1966 Report on 
the draft articles acknowledged the relative recent maturity of jus cogens, its limitation on 
state action, and its non-derogable character.
71
 While, for example, the International Court of 
Justice has been slow to fully grapple with jus cogens, their existence, largely in line with 
Verdross’ articulation, are accepted as part of the operation of the international legal order.72 
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Verdross’ influence as a pioneer of jus cogens is evident in the accepted characterisations of 
its operation. 
C. Verdross and Multilateralism  
The importance of multilateralism to Verdross is evident in the changes brought about by the 
Charter. A further example in his work is the debate on “the crises of neutrality” in the inter-
war period, particularly the legal ambiguity regarding neutrality and the League of Nations.
73
 
During this period, neutrality cycled between being an accepted aspect of international law, 
to a period of desuetude and back to primacy once again.
74
 Contrasting neutrality under the 
Charter and the Covenant is useful in understanding Verdross’ division of the disorganised 
and organised international community.
75
 
In the optimism of the League’s early years neutrality was no longer considered necessary.76 
However as the League waivered in its attempts to maintain world peace neutrality was 
reasserted. Neutral Switzerland joined the League,
77
 but changed the basis of its membership 
and eventually left when the incompatibility of neutrality and the League became clear.
78
 The 
Covenant did not have the substance to maintain its members through successive crises and 
this underpins Verdross’ separation of the disorganised and organised community. The Swiss 
finally became members of the UN, albeit it could be argued that neutrality is even less 
compatible with the Charter. It suggests something of the Charter’s nature and Verdross’ idea 
of an organised community that Switzerland felt compelled to join. While there was a 
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disorganised international community Switzerland was able to maintain an equivocal 
position, but in the post-Charter era this was no longer credible.
79
  
Verdross contends that the Security Council, in inviting members to take part in actions, does 
not have the same scope for mandatory action which the Covenant possessed.
80
 This may not 
necessarily be the case. While the Security Council may ask individual states to act it also can 
require states to take collective action under Chapter VII, which may not result in active 
participation in the use of force, but it can result in what, in other circumstances, would be a 
violation of the laws of neutrality.
81
  
It is true states have maintained their neutrality alongside UN membership, however this dual 
position has never been given a satisfactory legal explanation. Verdross argues that as the 
aims of the Covenant and the Charter are the same neutrality should be treated similarly.
82
 
Although the aims of the organisations were and are to maintain international peace and 
security, the Charter’s remit is broader. If the laws on the use of force under the Charter are 
indeed jus cogens as Verdross contended in 1966, then there can be no opt-out allowing 
individual states to maintain neutrality and membership of the UN.  
This theory of neutrality is more akin to what Verdross espouses regarding the pre-Charter 
disorganised community. In adding the Charter’s regulation of the use of force to the 
pantheon of jus cogens there is an assertion that the legal order established by the Charter is 
superior to other international legal obligations.
83
 This characterisation of the Charter or, at 
least part of it, as superior law to the rest of international law is an example of positivism and 
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does not sit comfortably in Verdross’ explication of international law and community. The 
UN represents the organised community.
84
 Utilising Verdross’ analysis, WTO membership, 
for example, is not a requisite of the organised community. It may be possible, however, to 
argue that as membership grows and its trade rules extend beyond the membership it is on a 
similar path to becoming part of the organised community. 
Simma argues that when they came to write their textbook together, Verdross regarded the 
Charter as the written constitution of the international community. After the death of 
Verdross and the publication, with Simma, of the 3
rd
 edition of Universelles Völkerrecht: 
Theorie und Praxis, the UN had almost universal membership.
85
 Verdross argued that the 
Charter constituted the constitution of the international community, though not necessarily a 
world constitution. This claim is no longer as radical as it once might have seemed. An 
evolution of the understanding of international law has occurred, regardless of disagreement 
as to the extent of this change.  
Carty argues that the most difficult part of Verdross and Simma’s constitutionalisation is the 
description of the transition from pre-civil to civil society reliant upon the Charter and its 
defects.
86
 Norms must legitimate the international community for it to exist. This is not 
suggesting that Verdross or Simma believed that the Charter provides a perfect constitutional 
document. Such a claim of idealism would, as Carty points out, reject the notion of politics in 
the development of international law and belies the evolution of international law, an 
essential character of Verdross’ constitutional perspective.87 Carty identifies two themes in 
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Universelles Völkerrecht.
88
 The first is a commitment to multilateralism and the Charter as a 
constitution of the world community. This Carty describes as idealistic, guided by Kantian 
normative political theory.
89
 This summation, however, does not fully account for 
Verdrossian constitutionalism as it does not relate the nuance in Verdross’ approach to jus 
cogens as norms of the constitutional order. What is clear is that the organised community 
centres upon the Charter and, as such, multilateralism is key to understanding Verdross’ 
approach to constitutionalisation. 
D. Verdrossian Constitutionalisation  
The degree of debt owed to Verdross by participants in the constitutionalisation debate that 
rely on jus cogens and community is examined next, but first it is crucial to establish a clear 
idea of what is encompassed within a Verdrossian constitutionalisation. Verdrossian 
constitutionalisation has two clear basis, jus cogens and international community. A third 
component, the Charter could also be included, but the degree to which this is essential to 
Verdrossian constitutionalisation is disputable. Certainly, the advent of the UN had a 
significant impact upon Verdross which is evident in his approach to constitutionalism and 
community. The importance of multilateralism is apparent early in his work, indeed, he 
recognised that ‘this constitution is … not set down in a document as is the case in most 
modern states and the League of Nations, which is at present the most comprehensive partial 
legal community.’90 Verdross argues that the legal order is hierarchical, interlinking with 
constitutional law, statutory law, executive decrees, administrative ordinances and 
decisions.
91
 The international community establishes a legal order with common ethical 
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standards epitomised in jus cogens. As such, jus cogens remains at the core of 
constitutionalisation. 
 
For Verdross, constitutionalisation was possible without a written document and it was some 
time after the UN’s creation that it became part of his constitutional approach. This suggests 
that Verdross saw international constitutionalism as potentially separate from any 
institutional framework. This early version, has as Simma argues, much in common with 
Kelsen.
92
 Arguably, taken as a whole, Verdross’ approach does not inevitably lead to the 
Charter, but could alternatively result in a wider approach to international 
constitutionalisation. This broader constitutional model relies on international norms such as 
jus cogens and erga omnes combined with their hierarchical evolution as the basis for a non-
codified constitutional structure. This alternative wider approach is arguably more attractive 
as it is not bound to the post Second World War era or to the deficiencies in the Charter.  
 
Verdross’ proposed constitutionalisation is not complete. The omission of entire sectors of 
international law, such as economic or environmental law, requires Verdross’ ideas to be 
developed further, a point discussed in the next section. Whether Verdrossian 
constitutionalisation can evolve without the Charter at its core is open to debate. This point 
becomes clearer in the following section which explores the varied theorists who could be 
described as Verdrossian in their analysis of constitutionalisation.  
3. Constitutionalisation in International Law  
 
International constitutionalisation theories are many and diverse and analysing all of them in 
this article is impossible. Nonetheless, several theorists engaged in the constitutionalisation 
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debate, Mosler, Tomuschat, De Wet, Peters, and Fassbender, are discussed to consider the 
impact of Verdross’ constitutionalisation theory. Some aspects of Verdross’ work, such as the 
Charter, are more clearly observable in the work of Fassbender or Simma yet theories that 
focus on jus cogens, community, or multilateralism are also significant in understanding his 
influence. The first group Mosler, Tomuschat, De Wet and Peters focus on core norms of 
constitutionalism while the second group Simma and Fassbender are fixed within the 
institutional constitutionalisation debate. Verdross’ influence in both groups is discussed. 
Simma and Fassbender are clear in their reliance on Verdross and Peters recognises his 
impact while others such as De Wet and Tomuschat cite Verdross but are not as direct in their 
transposition of his ideas.
93
 
 
Within constitutionalisation the place of jus cogens varies between being a core essential and 
only partially representing the debate.
94
 At times, jus cogens are used as ready-made 
constitutional norms, putting them in priority over obligations erga omnes, human rights or 
other aspects of international law.
95
 Arguably, this conception of international 
constitutionalisation, linking jus cogens and community, comes from a Verdrossian 
development of jus cogens.
96
 As with Verdross, jus cogens are combined with other aspects 
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of international law such as the Charter, community and multilateralism in developing 
constitutionalisation theories.  
 
Mosler, an early proponent of constitutionalisation, concentrates on the link between a 
common public order and international law norms. He differs in focus from Verdross in 
starting with erga omnes obligations. Whereas jus cogens are ‘a cogent law limiting freedom 
of contract,’97 it is erga omnes which underpin international constitutional principles.98 
Further, Mosler did not identify the Charter as central to constitutionalisation, though he did 
suggest that at some point it may become vital. Mosler observes that the difficulty with 
treaties such as the Charter (and arguably the WTO Agreement) is that their object is 
restricted compared with the traditional understanding of the subject remit of a constitution 
thus marrying international constitutionalisation to the domestic evocations of constitution.
99
 
As a near-contemporary of Verdross, Mosler’s use of jus cogens and erga omnes is 
significant as it places them at the heart of a constitutional order which is established 
exclusive of an institutional structure and focuses instead on a common public order. Both 
Mosler and Verdross are concerned with community, but it is in the character of the norms 
that underpin that community they differ.
100
  
 
In contrast to Verdross, where jus cogens pre-date the organised community, for Tomuschat 
the existence of jus cogens norms establishes an international community based upon, 
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‘axiomatic premises other than State sovereignty.’101 For Tomuschat, jus cogens are 
declaratory, as no additional corroboration is necessary. As such it is the differentiation 
between consensual and non-consensual elements of international law that is central to 
constitutionalisation.
 102
 Verdross' influence is apparent in the description of a shift from a 
disorganised to an organised community which is interdependent and reliant on non-
consensual norms of international law.
103
  
Similar to Mosler, Tomuschat suggests the limited competence of the Charter means that it 
cannot be considered a constitution of humankind.
104
 Tomuschat’s constitution is founded on 
the assumption that there are central rules to the system which states, from their inception, are 
instituted into and this is the basis upon which international law operates. He describes how 
meta-rules, the rules that lay out how other rules are to be made, enter into force and are 
implemented. This, he argues, together with executive and judicial functions, form the 
constitution of any system of governance.
105 
Tomuschat is reliant on Verdross’ development 
of jus cogens but his constitutionalism varies from Verdross to the extent that jus cogens exist 
as part of the international legal order, whereas for Verdross jus cogens are independent of 
community, though not necessarily independent of constitutionalism.
 
De Wet identifies constitutionalisation as the ‘process of (re)organisation and (re)allocation 
of competencies among the subjects of the international legal order, which shapes the 
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international community, its value system and enforcement.’106 De Wet recognises 
constitutionalism as a system of governance that ‘provide[s] a legal framework for the 
political life of a community.’107 De Wet argues that the international constitutional order 
consists of an international community, an international value system and a basic structure for 
its enforcement.
108
 Taking hierarchy, international community, a value orientated order and 
liberal constitutional traditions as a starting point De Wet establishes a form of incremental 
constitutionalisation.
109
 Importantly, De Wet pins constitutionalisation to a value oriented 
scheme which relies upon a Verdrossian form of jus cogens norms as underlying principles of 
constitutionalism.  
According to De Wet, it is in the post-Charter era that jus cogens became accepted, which 
while accurate to the extent of its adoption into the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties runs counter to Verdross’ description of the development of these norms. Yet, for 
both Verdross and De Wet jus cogens norms are central to understanding the development 
beyond the core norms of a value system binding on the international legal order.
110
 These are 
followed by customary international law which is characterised by emerging erga omnes 
norms.
111
 She states that ‘[i]t is of a layered nature as it includes the (sometimes overlapping) 
layers of universal ius cogens norms and erga omnes obligations.’112  
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While, De Wet bases her constitutionalism on the assumption of an ever ‘increasingly 
integrated international legal order,’113 evidently Verdross’ development of jus cogens is 
influential. Significantly, De Wet considers a constitutional order to be beyond the remit of 
an institutional structure which, as with Verdross, is, in any case, reliant on core norms. De 
Wet regards the Charter as a connecting factor of importance which remains central for 
structural enforcement of the value system of a constitutional order.
114
 The Charter embeds a 
hierarchy established in jus cogens and erga omnes and in turn the fundamental norms core to 
international constitutionalisation.
115
  
For De Wet the Charter ultimately fails as a constitution since the international community 
extends beyond states while the UN is actively state-centric.
116
 Such criticism could be 
extended to the regional and functional organisations which De Wet also considers part of the 
international community.
117
 De Wet points to the adoption of the Charter as a ‘constitutional 
moment’ in international law increasing the speed of change.118 Yet, De Wet’s international 
community remains tied to the function of the international legal order in situ. De Wet moves 
beyond Verdross and in doing so highlights the difficulties with his reliance on the Charter. 
As the international community expands beyond states, the Charter’s limitations become 
more evident.  
Despite these differences both the community and value based ethic of De Wet’s approach 
has a Verdrossian perspective to its constitutionalisation. While the pre-Charter development 
of jus cogens and community is largely omitted from De Wet’s constitutionalisation a clear 
lineage may be drawn in her understanding of the Charter’s role. As with Verdross, the 
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Charter is core to De Wet’s constitutionalisation, but also, in kind with Verdross, the Charter 
is not the bastion of the constitutional values underpinning the process of 
constitutionalisation.  
Peters acknowledges Verdross’ work as seminal, particularly with regard to the international 
community however his work is also evident in other aspects of her work.
119
 Peters’ 
constitutionalism is firmly rooted within the present legal order, though with a reformist eye, 
and argues for a constitutional re-interpretation of international law.
120
 This constitutional re-
interpretation does not require a reinvention of international law or constitutionalism but 
rather a reimagining of the order as it is currently constructed.
121
 What sets Peters’ 
constitutionalisation theory apart is the claim that a process which de-constitutionalises states 
is underway. The move away from consent-based international law allied with the 
fundamental norms present in an international constitutional order substitute for the loss of 
authority within states and the expansion of the international legal order.
122
 This is a form of 
a compensatory constitutionalism.
123
 In Peters’ model, representation of interests can move 
between orders, from the state to the international level.
124
  
Significantly, Peters rejects the formal constitution and regards the core norms of the 
international legal order as the basis for constitutional function.
125
 Peters argues that rather 
than formalist rules, constitutional norms are more significant in understanding law’s 
substance.
126
 She relies upon a community-based constitutional order not founded upon 
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solidarity but rather upon identifiable elements of international law which she describes as 
global goods.
127
 This is not linked to an identification of the content of such a community 
though Peters does recognise a global constitutional community consisting of individuals, 
states, international organisations, NGOs, and business actors while acknowledging the 
current strong position of the state.
128
 While this places states at the centre of Peters’ 
arguments, she nonetheless acknowledges the difficulties with norms such as democratic 
legitimacy in the current international legal order.
129
 Importantly, particularly from a 
Verdrossian constitutional perspective, as human rights are the principal norms, state 
sovereignty coupled with a loosening of state consent, is foundational only from what she 
describes as an ‘ontological’ perspective.130 What is of most relevance in Peters’ work is her 
concentration on constitutional norms, identifiable within the non-consensual elements of 
international law, as the basis for analysis. The Charter does not serve the organised 
community in the same manner for Peters as for Verdross, nor are jus cogens as central for 
Peters. Nonetheless, it is in the core norms of international law which underpin the 
community where their kindred approach is evident.  
Both Peters and De Wet in centring constitutionalisation upon core norms and not particular 
institutional structures are very close to what Verdross was describing when discussing the 
international constitutional order and thus are closer than what may first appear to Verdross. 
This first branch of the constitutionalisation debate has considerably claims to Verdross than 
other, more initially obviously connected, approaches.  
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As a prime exponent of the second form of Verdrossian constitutionalisation, Fassbender is 
one of most ardent advocates of the Charter as a constitution for the global legal order.
131
 
Fassbender considers the establishment of the Charter as coming ‘out of the fog’ of indistinct 
constitutional rhetoric.
132
 Significantly, he credits Verdross as one of the earliest proponents 
of constitutionalisation and firmly places Verdross within the Charter-based approach.
133
  
Fassbender’s approach is significant as it assumes the UN is on a different plain to, for 
example, the WTO. Proof of its character, suggested by Fassbender, is the Charter’s lack of 
definite guidance on non-original members of the UN signing or ratifying the Charter, which 
he suggests deviates from traditional treaty-making and elevates the Charter.
134
 Fassbender 
recognises the state-based nature of the Charter as significant particularly with regard to the 
community and constitutionalism. According to Fassbender within the international 
community constituent power lies with the ‘Peoples of the United Nations’ who act through 
their governments.
135
 This maintains a statist approach to both constitutionalisation and 
community. 
A second aspect of Fassbender’s approach is the establishment, by the Charter, of a hierarchy 
of norms. The core benefit of placing the UN, as Verdross did in his later work, at the centre 
of international constitutionalisation, is in establishing the relationship between general 
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international and UN law.
136
 UN governance is central to Fassbender’s approach to how law 
is made and adjudicated. Accordingly, the Charter comprises rules on governance in the 
international community such as how international law is formed and applied as well as 
international adjudication.
137
  
Fassbender regards the General Assembly as the closest to a representative organ within the 
international order. Fassbender argues that state sovereignty is clarified by the Charter and 
displaces questions regarding the nature of representation. Here, there is a disconnect with 
Verdross’ international community and his view of sovereignty. Designating the General 
Assembly as representative of the world is dependent upon state officials in a state-centric 
model. The General Assembly is representative of state views certainly, but not necessarily 
representative of the international community. Second, Fassbender’s state centric form of 
constitutionalism places a particularly flawed governance system at the core of both the 
Charter and international constitutionalism. This distinction between seeing the Charter as 
constitutional and drawing analogies from the perspective of interpretation or reform of the 
Charter is significant as it is more closely akin to Verdross’ perception of the role of the 
Charter in an organised community.  
Verdross’ position on the Charter as epitomising constitutionalisation appears equivocal 
when its significance is weighed against the importance of jus cogens. This combination of 
jus cogens norms and the Charter is close to Verdrossian constitutionalisation yet the reliance 
on the Charter first, with norms dependent upon its governance structure places Fassbender 
apart from Verdross and highlights the placement of a flawed document such as the Charter 
at the centre of a this form of constitutional order. 
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Simma sees constitutionalism as combining two elements; first it has precedence over other 
law, and second it sets out a basic governance structure.
138
 Simma applies this test to the 
Charter and finds it constitutional.
139
 Yet, this test relies on the Charter to establish its 
content. This explanation could not be applied to either another treaty document, such as the 
WTO Agreement, or to a broader conception of constitutionalism that could be identified 
across several doctrines or documents. This characterisation of constitutionalism centres on 
the assumption that it will be the Charter that will fulfil the criterion.
140
 The Charter is 
combined with jus cogens and erga omnes to establish a version of constitutionalisation 
centred on the state and Charter as the fulcrum around which international law operates.
141
 
This is major departure from the Verdrossian perspective which is more incremental in its 
division of international law into the pre- and post- Charter eras and is not centred on the 
Charter as the source of constitutionalism. While Verdross placed the Charter within 
constitutionalisation this was in combination with jus cogens which are the foundation of the 
international legal order. In displacing jus cogens and placing such emphasis on the Charter 
arguably Simma is moving beyond the core of Verdross' theory of constitutionalisation.
 
Verdross’ perspective on the role of jus cogens in constitutionalism is evident in most of the 
theories just discussed; however how well this has been translated into a fully realised 
Verdrossian form of constitutionalisation is disputable. In their reliance on norms Mosler, 
Tomuschat and De Wet certainly are Verdrossian in their constitutionalism however, they 
diverge in how they have developed it beyond Verdross’ reliance on norms. De Wet’s focus 
on erga omnes may be contrasted with Simma’s and Tomuschat’s concentration on jus 
cogens. Peters, in setting aside all institutional structures and focusing upon a community and 
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norms is closer to Verdross than may at first appear evident, yet Mosler, Tomuschat, De Wet 
and Peters do not place much significance on the Charter. While the second group, 
Fassbender and Simma, do regard the Charter as core to constitutionalisation, in starting with 
the Charter they arguably lose sight of Verdross’ focus on jus cogens. 
A purist Verdrossian approach to constitutionalisation is established by a community which 
creates a positive legal order with core common standards as epitomised by jus cogens. The 
traces of jus cogens, community and international governance evident in each of the theories 
establishes a Verdrossian vein, though not emulation in the contemporary debate. Arguably, 
it is the first group which centres upon core norms that has the most in common with 
Verdross. The second Charter-based group, in remaining so close to the Charter are, 
arguably, continue the weakest aspect of Verdross’ theory.  
4. Conclusion 
Fassbender argues that, in 1926, Verdross was the first to make use of international 
constitutionalism.
142
 Indeed, while constitutional language may be traced to Holtzendorff, in 
1877, or Bridgeman in 1911,
143
 Verdross was the first to use it in a systematic fashion. 
Simma argues, that by constitution, Verdross meant ‘the norms that regulate the basic order 
of a community, that is, its structure, organisation, and allocation of competences.’144 In this, 
Verdross relies on core principles such as jus cogens, the overall unity of the system of 
international law and the hierarchy or ‘pyramid’ of sources of law. His wider contribution to 
the development of jus cogens, the Charter and a natural law ethic is also evident and assures 
that even where Verdrossian constitutionalisation is disputed or considered ill-advised the 
impact of his work is still felt. 
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In addressing Verdross’ impact upon international constitutionalisation there are certain key 
motifs in his work. The most obvious of these is his reliance on jus cogens, community and 
the Charter. In arguing for a more nuanced international legal order beyond the remit of the 
pure consent of states, in acknowledging that the international law cannot simply be 
explained away by sovereignty and is, in fact, a complex legal order, Verdross has been 
highly influential. 
 
Verdross’ contribution to international law in the 20th Century and his considerable influence 
on the expansion of the international constitutionalisation debate is clearly acknowledged by 
those who claim direct ancestry such as Simma and Fassbender, but is also apparent, though 
perhaps in a less direct fashion, in the work of other figures such as De Wet, Peters, 
Tomuschat or Mosler. In his systematic approach to jus cogens, community and the natural 
law, Verdross established a constitutional perspective on the international legal order which 
has resonated in many of the theories that have followed. He enabled other international legal 
theorists to consider constitutionalisation without as much scepticism as may have otherwise 
been the case. While Simma and Fassbender are the most obvious adherents to the 
Verdrossian view of international constitutionalisation others, particularly De Wet and Peters, 
may be considered to be following in the path and arguably are closer in spirit, to a norm-
based constitutionalisation as advocated by Verdross.  
 
As one of the first proponents of a coherent constitutional analysis of international law 
Verdross’ offers a rationale understanding of the place of constitutionalisation within the 
international legal order. While Simma located this constitutionalisation within the Charter, 
arguably it is Verdross’ reliance on identifiable core norms of a higher order, which is most 
significant for the contemporary debate. The evolution and role of jus cogens and the Charter 
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as well as other aspects of the debate are intrinsically linked to Verdross and require a return 
to him to understand their development. Indeed, in re-examining some of Verdross’ claims it 
may lead to rejection of the constitutionalisation cause but it may also engender more 
coherence in the claims made upon Verdross and constitutionalisation more generally. 
